

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, NO SOPN

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT FOR NATO IN NORWAY

1. SUMMARY: THE RENEWED AND REFINED EMPHASIS BY USNATO ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMMING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AS REFLECTED IN USNATO 4713 AND 6906, HAS PROMPTED US TO DO A COM-

PREHENSIVE RE-EVALUATION OF OUR NATO SUPPORT PROGRAM. IN BIREF, THIS RE-EVALUATION INDICATED A NEED FOR A MORE SOPHISTICATED APPROACH TO NATO PROGRAMMING, A DOUBLING OF USIS OSLO AND USIS/USNATO EXPENDITURES ON NATO PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMS IN NORWAY, AND A PARALLEL NEED FOR MORE ALLIANCE ATTENTION TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS. THIS MESSAGE SPELLS OUT IN DETAIL OSLO'S NEWLY DEFINED NATO PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN, THE RATIONALE FOR IT, AND REQUESTS NEEDED SUPPORT FROM USNATO (END SUMMARY).

2. OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, USIS OSLO HAS DEVOTED A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF ITS RESOURCES TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT FOR NATO AND HAS DEVELOPED SEVERAL ON-GOING PROGRAMS THAT HAVE BY NOW ALMOST BECOME ROUTINE. IN AN EFFORT TO MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF THESE PROGRAMS AND TO DETERMINE HOW THE MISSION CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY PROVIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE IN THE FUTURE, THE POST HAS UNDERTAKEN A FULL EVALUATION OF ITS NATO PROGRAMMING. THIS EVALUATION FOLLOWS.

3. PUBLIC ATTITUDES. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO IN NORWAY ARE INFLUENCED FAR MORE BY EVENTS AND BY NORWAY'S GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY TO THE SOVIET UNION THAN THEY EVER WILL BE BY EVEN THE BEST CONCEIVED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMMING IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLIANCE. THERE CAN BE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR VIGOROUS AND CLEAR U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLIANCE. AND SOVIET ACTIONS, TOO, HAVE MADE AND WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE, AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS HERE ABOUT THE NEED FOR AND UTILITY OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS WAS DEMONSTRATED DRAMATICALLY IN NATO
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POLLS TAKEN HERE BEFORE AND AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND MORE RECENTLY BY GENERAL PUBLIC REACTION TO SOVIET POWER PLAYS IN ITS RELATIONS WITH NORWAY. NONETHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NATO IN NORWAY WOULD BE LOWER IF THERE HAD BEEN NO LONG-TERM PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT.

4. TOGETHER, NORWAY'S PROXIMITY TO THE USSR, EVENTS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMMING HAVE PRODUCED A REASSURING LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NATO IN NORWAY, PERHAPS ONE OF THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN THE ALLIANCE. THE ONE RELEVANT POLL TAKEN EACH YEAR SHOWS A CONSISTENT PATTERN OF ROUGHLY SIXTY PERCENT SUPPORT EXTENDING ACROSS ALL AGE GROUPS, INCOME LEVELS, GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RELATIVELY SMALL SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY. AT THE SAME TIME, ONLY A FEW NORWEGIANS-- FIVE TO SEVEN PERCENT--OPPOSE NATO, WHILE ABOUT ONE-THIRD APPEAR INDIFFERENT.

5. BUT WE SHOULD NOT TAKE NORWAY'S SUPPORT FOR GRANTED. THOUGH

REASSURING, THESE STATISTICS--BY THEIR NATURE--OVERLOOK THE EXISTENCE OF SOME HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT SUB-GROUPS IN NORWEGIAN SOCIETY THAT ARE RATHER NEGATIVE OR AT LEAST UNCERTAIN ABOUT NORWAY'S TIES TO THE ALLIANCE. MANY YOUNG POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE INFLUENTIAL LEFT-WING OF THE LABOR PARTY FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY--AND THESE TWO GROUPS COULD HAVE AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

6. MOREOVER, THE ANNUAL NATO POLL ALSO DOES NOT MEASURE THE DEPTH AND NATURE OF THE PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE. THIS, WE BELIEVE, DIFFERS SUBSTANTIALLY BETWEEN THE OVER-40 AND UNDER-40 AGE GROUPS. PEOPLE OVER 40, WHO REMEMBER THE LAST WAR, HAVE A VERY PERSONAL PERCEPTION OF WHAT NATIONAL SECURITY MEANS AND OF THE DANGERS FOR NORWAY OF NOT BEING ADEQUATELY PROTECTED. THE UNDER-40S DO NOT HAVE THIS PERSONAL AND EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE, AND WHILE THEY GENERALLY SUPPORT THE ALLIANCE, THEY APPEAR TO

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DO SO WITH MUCH LESS CONVICTION. SOME OF THEM REJECT THE PREMISE THAT ALL NATO NATIONS SHARE A BASIC COMMON HERITAGE, AND IN TURN QUESTION THE VERY HYPOTHESIS OF ALLIANCE COOPERATION. DIS- ENCHANTMENT WITH THE VIETNAM WAR, WATERGATE AND ALLEGED CIA WRONG-DOINGS HAS ERODED THE STOCK OF GOODWILL TOWARDS THE U.S. AMONG MANY YOUNG NORWEGIANS.

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7. THE ANNUAL NATO POLL LIKEWISE DOES NOT MEASURE THE CREDIBILITY
OF THE ALLIANCE--OR SPECIFICALLY THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
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U.S.
COMMITMENT TO IT. JUDGING FROM EDITORIAL REACTION AND OUR
CONVERSATIONS HERE, MANY NORWEGIANS HAVE JUST BEEN THROUGH A
PERIOD OF DOUBT ABOUT WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO COME TO
THEIR DEFENSE. RECENTLY, WE BELIEVE THESE DOUBTS HAVE SUBSIDED
SOMEWHAT, PROBABLY AS A RESULT OF STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY
HIGH U.S. OFFICIALS, A RECORD U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET, ENCOURAGING
U.S. OPINION POLLS, AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUCH AS THE TEAMWORK
EXERCISE, U.S. AND NATO SHIP VISITS AND FREQUENT VISITS BY TOP
U.S. MILITARY LEADERS.

8. FAITH IN THE U.S., HOWEVER, ALSO HAS ITS NEGATIVE SIDE IN
THIS CONTEXT. MANY NORWEGIANS FEEL THEMSELVES "THE LITTLE
GUY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS" AND ARE RESIGNED TO THE IDEA THAT
THE U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR UMBRELLA IS NORWAY'S ONLY CREDIBLE
DEFENSE. THIS LEADS NORWEGIANS TO COAST SOMEWHAT TOO READILY ON
THE COAT-TAILS OF NOT ONLY THE U.S. BUT FOR SOME THE USSR AS
WELL. THE RESULT IS AN UNDERMINING OF EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN
AND UPDATE NORWAY'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND A POTENTIALLY
DANGEROUS RESIGNATION, EVEN AMONG RESPONSIBLE NORWEGIANS, THAT
NOTHING NORWAY DOES TO IMPORVE ITS DEFENSES REALLY MATTERS. IN
ADDITION TO REDUCING SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE SPENDING, THIS ATTITUDE
OVER TIME CAN RENDER NORWAY INCREASINGLY SUSCEPTABLE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND POLITICAL PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

9. DETENTE, TOO, HAS HAD A CONTRADICTORY EFFECT ON NORWEGIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT FROM THE WARSAW PACT. ON THE ONE HAND, DETENTE HAS PROBABLY REDUCED GENERAL PUBLIC CONCERN OVER THE THREAT TO NORWAY AND LESSENER THE FEELING THAT A STRONG ALLIANCE DEFENSE REMAINS ESSENTIAL. AN UNRELEASED GALLUP POLL LAST SPRING SHOWED THAT 66 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE ASKED BELIEVED THERE WAS NO DANGER OF AN ATTACK ON NORWAY IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS. WHILE 29 PERCENT OF THE RESPONDENTS THOUGHT AN ATTACK WAS POSSIBLE, MOST OF THESE (58 PERCENT) DID NOT THINK SUCH AN ATTACK COULD BE TURNED BACK. WHILE DETENTE HAS IN SOME WAYS REDUCED CONCERN, IT HAS ALSO HAD THE OPPOSITE EFFECT. HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

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PUBLICIZED SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT UNWILLINGNESS TO LIVE UP TO SOME ASPECTS OF CSCE (PARTICULARLY BASKET II) HAS LED MANY NORWEGIANS TO DOUBT EASTERN DEDICATION TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. AND NO RESPONSIBLE NORWEGIAN CAN IGNORE THE LARGE BUILD-UP OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCE ACROSS THE BORDER IN THE KOLA PENINSULA. WHEN THESE CONTRADICTORY INFLUENCES ARE TAKEN TOGETHER WITH FREQUENT OFFICIAL REMINDERS OF HOW DETENTE DEPENDS ON ALLIANCE STRENGTH, THE OVERALL IMPACT OF DETENTE ON SUPPORT FOR NATO HAS PROBABLY BEEN FAVORABLE. WITH DETENTE, THE GON CAN ARGUE THAT THE ALLIANCE PROVIDES NORWAY WITH BOTH SECURITY AND REDUCED TENSIONS. IF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE COOLS, WE MIGHT WELL SEE OVER TIME A POLARIZATION BETWEEN THOSE WHO WOULD URGE NORWAY TO SEEK ITS OWN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE USSR AND THOSE WHO WOULD FAVOR STRENGTHENED TIES WITH THE WEST.

10. OVERALL, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THESE POSITIVE PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO HAVE HELPED KEEP NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY TIED TO THE WEST, AVOIDING THE MORE INSULAR SCANDINAVIAN VIEW OF THE WORLD WHICH NORWAY HAS TRADITIONALLY HELD THROUGHOUT MOST OF HER HISTORY. THE CURRENT LABOR GOVERNMENT IS CLEARLY RESPONSIVE, WITH ONLY MINOR LAPSES, TO THIS PUBLIC CONSENSUS THAT NORWAY IS INEXTRICABLY TIED TO THE WEST AND PARTICULARLY TO ITS ALLIANCE PARTNERS.

11. SO WHY SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO HERE? BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE HAS NOT YET BEEN ADEQUATELY TRANSLATED INTO SUPPORT FOR INCREASED DEFENSE SPENDING.

12. SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE SPENDING. A USIA POLL TAKEN IN FOUR WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LAST SUMMER INDICATES THAT EVEN THOUGH THERE IS A HIGH-LEVEL OF CONSENSUS FOR NATO AND AN INCREASING CONCERN OVER NATO'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF, THERE IS LITTLE PUBLIC WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT A LARGER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE. THOUGH NORWAY WAS NOT AMONG THE COUNTRIES SURVEYED, WE BELIEVE NORWEGIAN VIEWS ARE THE SAME. OUR IMPRESSIONS

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ARE SUPPORTED BY ANALYSES OF TRENDS IN NORWEGIAN DEFENSE SPENDING, WHICH WE PRESUME BROADLY REFLECT THE PUBLIC WILL. FOR EXAMPLE, NORWAY NOW SPENDS A SMALLER PORTION OF ITS NATIONAL BUDGET ON DEFENSE THAN IT DID DURING THE 1930S, A DECADE WHOSE DEFENSE EFFORT--TO PUT IT DELICATELY--WAS NOTED FOR NEITHER VIGOR NOR EFFECTIVENESS. OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS, DEFENSE SPENDING HAS DECREASED FROM ALMOST 20 PERCENT TO ONLY 10 PERCENT OF THE BUDGET. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THIS TREND TOOK PLACE UNDER BOTH SOCIALIST AND NON-SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTS.

13. TO SUM UP PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO IN NORWAY, IT SEEMS SAFE TO CONCLUDE THAT:

A) THERE IS A RATHER HIGH LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE ALLIANCE BUT LESS UNDERSTANDING OF DETENTE AND THE CONCOMITANT NEED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES;

B) A COMFORTABLE MAJORITY SUPPORTS NORWEGIAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, BUT A FEW GROUPS--PARTICULARLY YOUTH--SEEM TO DO SO WITH RATHER SHALLOW CONVICTION. THERE ARE ARTICULATE AND VOCAL OPPONENTS--MANY OF THEM POTENTIAL LEADERS--TO NORWAY'S MEMBERSHIP, WHO ALSO REJECT THE IDEA THAT A COMMON CULTURAL HERITAGE TIES NORWAY TO THE WEST; C) THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONFIDENCE THAT NATO AND THE U.S.

CAN AND WOULD COME TO NORWAY'S DEFENSE IN A CRISIS;

D) THERE IS LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR INCREASED DEFENSE SPENDING TO MAINTAIN NATO'S DETERRENT CAPABILITY.

14. OUR ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES CALLS FOR A REFINEMENT IN THE NATURE OF OSLO'S PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMMING IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLIANCE.

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15. IN THE PAST, OUR PROGRAMS HAVE NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY RESPON-
SIVE TO THE SPECIFIC ATTITUDINAL PROBLEMS WE FACE. WE HAVE GEARED
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MOST OF OUR PROGRAMS, REGARDLESS OF THE AUDIENCE, TO
THE GENERAL GOAL OF PROVIDING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THE
ALLIANCE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONDS IN A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRON-
MENT. SPECIFIC PROGRAM THEMES HAVE EMERGED HAPHAZARDLY. NONE-
THELESS, CERTAIN ASPACTS OF OUR PROGRAMMING HAVE BEEN RATHER
EFFECTIVE AND SHOULD BE BUILT ON. MOST EFFECTIVE HAVE BEEN THE
TOURS TO NATO AND SHPAE HEADQUARTERS, AFSOUTH, SIXTH FLEET AND
OCCASIONALLY EUCOM, WHICH HAVE REACHED NUMEROUS TOP OPINION-
MARKERS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT. OUR ABILITY TO ATTRACT TOP
PEOPLE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED LARGELY TO THE RESPONSIVENESS OF TOP
ALLIANCE LEADERS TO MEETINGS WITH OUR GROUPS AND TO THE
SIXTH FLEET'S READINESS TO ARRANGE AIRCRAFT CARRIER VISITS.
WE ALSO SUPPORT TWO NORWEGIAN ATLANTIC COMMITTEE NATO SEMINARS
EACH YEAR, AND ENGAGE IN THE MORE ROUTINE NATO-SUPPORT PROGRAMMING
SUCH AS INVITING SECURITY POLICY SPEAKERS, PUBLICIZING SHIP
VISITS, AND ARRANGING FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE FOR JOURNALISTS
INTERESTED IN NATO-RELATED SUBJECTS.

16. IN THE FUTURE, WE INTEND TO TAILOR OUR NATO SUPPORT PROGRAMS MUCH MORE CLOSELY TO THE INTENDED AUDIENCE. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED EIGHT PROGRAM THEMES WHICH WE HAVE MATCHED WITH SEVEN PRIORITY AUDIENCES AS FOLLOWS:

A) HELP MAINTAIN, AND DEVELOP WHERE NECESSARY, SUPPORT FOR NORWAY'S CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND EMPHASIZE THAT NORWAY SHARES A COMMON CULTURAL HERITAGE WITH OTHER NATO COUNTRIES THAT CAN BEST BE SAFEGUARDED BY SUCH COOPERATION. (TARGET GROUPS: YOUNG POLITICAL LEADERS, LABOR LEADERS, UPPER LEVEL TEACHERS, LOCAL PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS).

B) DEVELOP AWARENESS THAT A STRONG DEFENSE IS A FUNDAMENTAL PREREQUISITE TO A POLICY OF DETENTE, AND THAT IN VIEW OF LARGE WARSAW PACT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, NATO NATIONS--INCLUDING NORWAY--MUST SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THEIR DEFENSE BUDGETS IF ALLIANCE DETRIMENTAL CAPABILITY IS TO BE MAINTAINED. (POLITICAL LEADERS, FINANCE OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS, YOUNG POLITICAL LEADERS, LABOR LEADERS, UPPER LEVEL TEACHERS, LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS).

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C) MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND THE ALLIES, INCLUDING NORWAY, IN TIME OF CRISIS. BUT WE EXPECT NORWAY AND THE ALLIES TO DO THEIR PART, TOO. (POLITICAL LEADERS, FINANCE OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS, LABOR LEADERS).

D) HELP NORWEGIANS TO UNDERSTAND THAT EACH GEOGRAPHIC AREA IN THE ALLIANCE IS IMPORTANT TO OVERALL ALLIANCE SECURITY; DEVELOP A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE SOUTHERN FLANK AND SPAIN TO ALLIED DEFENSE. (POLITICAL LEADERS, JOURNALISTS, YOUNG POLITICAL LEADERS, LABOR LEADERS, UPPER LEVEL TEACHERS, LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS).

E) FOSTER INCREASED UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IN A NUCLEAR AGE. (FINANCE OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS, YOUNG POLITICAL LEADERS, LABOR LEADERS, UPPER LEVEL TEACHERS, LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS).

F) DEVELOP PUBLIC AWARENESS OF HOW DEFENSE SPENDING CAN CONTRIBUTE TO NATIONAL ECONOMIC HEALTH. (ALL AUDIENCE GROUPS).

G) DEVELOP GREATER AWARENESS THAT NATO MUST INCREASINGLY CONCERN ITSELF, AT LEAST AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, WITH EVENTS OUTSIDE THE DEFINED TREATY AREA IN RESPONSE TO INCREASING SOVIET APPLICATION OF A GLOBAL STRATEGY. (POLITICAL LEADERS, JOURNALISTS, LABOR LEADERS).

H) DEVELOP PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE FOR NUCLEAR PORT VISITS TO NORWAY. (POLITICAL LEADERS, JOURNALISTS, LABOR LEADERS, LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS).

17. OUR EVALUATION OF OUR NATO PROGRAMMING ALSO INDICATES THAT WE SHOULD SPEND A HIGHER PROPORTION OF USIS OPERATING FUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLIANCE. THOUGH NATO PROGRAMMING IS MAJOR

PART OF THE FIRST OF THE THREE USIS COUNTRY PLAN OBJECTIVES AND PRESUMABLY SHOULD REPRESENT AT LEAST A THIRD OF THE POST'S OPERATING BUDGET, USIS IN FY1976 DEVOTED ONLY EIGHTEEN PERCENT OF ITS TOTAL OPERATING FUNDS (EXCLUDING FIXED COSTS) TO NATO PROGRAM SUPPORT.

18. TO BRING EXPENDITURES MORE INTO LINE WITH THE COUNTRY PLAN,
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WE INTEND TO SHIFT MORE EXISTING USIS PROGRAM RESOURCES INTO AN EXPANDED NATO-SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR THE REMAINDER OF FY-77. OUR TOTAL NATO PROGRAM EXPENDITURES WILL RISE TO \$45,200, OR DOUBLE THE PRESENT LEVEL. WE ARE READY TO COMMIT \$22,600 TO THIS PROGRAM AND REQUEST USIS/USNATO TO PROVIDE AN EQUAL AMOUNT, AS OFFERED IN USNATO 6906, FOR THE PROGRAMS SPELLED OUT BELOW.

19. IF USNATO FUNDS ARE FORTHCOMING, OSLO PLANS TO CARRY OUT IN THE REMAINDER OF FY-77 THE FOLLOWING EXPANDED PROGRAM.

20. JANUARY 1977.

A) NATO TOUR JAN. 12-20 FOR SIX YOUNG POLITICAL LEADERS TO NATO, SHAPE, MBFR, AFSOUTH AND SIXTH FLEET. TOTAL COST \$7,700.

B) MOTIVATE ONE JOURNALIST TO FOCUS ON THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ALLIED DEFENSE. NO COST.

C) ARRANGE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EXPOSURE FOR CINCSOUTH DURING HIS VISIT TO NORWAY JAN. 24-25.

D) IDENTIFY AND MOTIVATE A FREE-LANCE WRITER TO TAKE THE LEAD IN STIMULATING OTHER REGULAR CONTRIBUTORS TO NORWEGIAN DAILIES TO FOCUS ON DEFENSE SPENDING. NO COST.

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21. FEBRUARY 1977.

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A) NATO TOUR FEB. 23-MAR. 2 (FEB. 24 AT NATO) FOR SIX POLITICAL LEADERS TO NATO, SHAPE, IBERLANT, AFSOUTH AND SIXTH FLEET. TOTAL COST \$6,500.

B) PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND VOLSPKR RICHARD BURT FOR THE ATLANTIC COMMITTEE'S ANNUAL LEANGKOLLEN SEMINAR TO WHICH A CROSS-SECTION OF PUBLIC OPINION LEADERS IS INVITED (FEB. 14-18). TOTAL COST \$3,650.

C) IDENTIFY AND ENGAGE A NORWEGIAN SCHOLAR TO STUDY HOW DEFENSE SPENDING CONTRIBUTES TO THE NORWEGIAN ECONOMY AND EVENTUALLY PUBLISH HIS STUDY. EVENTUAL TOTAL COST \$1,550.

D) MOTIVATE ATLANTIC COMMITTEE TO INVITE NORWEGIAN-SPEAKING EXPERT TO LECTURE ON THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE AND PROVIDE TRAVEL COSTS AND PER DIEM. TOTAL COST \$700.

E) MEET WITH DIRECTORS OF TWO NORWEGIAN DEFENSE ASSOCIATIONS TO DISCUSS HOW WE MIGHT COOPERATE IN FUTURE NATO SUPPORT PROJECTS.

NO COST.

2. MARCH 1977.

A) ARRANGE A PUBLIC AFFAIRS VISIT TO NORWAY BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO NATO.

B) MOTIVATE ONE JOURNALIST TO FOCUS ON THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE. NO COST.

C) MOTIVATE ONE JOURNALIST TO FOCUS ON THE TREND TOWARD AN ALL-NUCLEAR POWERED U.S. NAVY. NO COST EXPECTED.

23. APRIL 1977.

A) NATO TOUR APRIL 20-27 (APR. 21 AT NATO) FOR SIX YOUNG POLITICAL LEADERS TO NATO, SHAPE, AFSOUTH AND SIXTH FLEET AND CONFIDENTIAL

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PERHAPS MBFR OR EUCOM. TOTAL COST \$6,500.

24. MAY 1977

A) NATO TOUR MAY 4-11 (MAY 5 AT NATO) FOR SIX OFFICIALS OF THE FINANCE AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES AND THE FINANCE COMMITTEE OF THE STORTING TO NATO, SHAPE, AND OTHER POINTS WHICH CAN OFFER SOLID PROGRAMMING ON THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE. TOTAL COST \$5,300.

25. JUNE 1977.

A) NATO TOUR JUNE 8-18 (JUNE 9 AT NATO) FOR SIX LEADING JOURNALISTS TO NATO, SHAPE, EUCOM, MBFR AND/OR SALT, AFSOUTH AND SIXTH FLEET. TOTAL COST \$8,000.

26. AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1977

A) NATO TOUR LATE SEPTEMBER FOR SIX LABOR LEADERS TO NATO, SHAPE, AFSOUTH, SIXTH FLEET AND POSSIBLY EUCOM. TOTAL COST \$5,300.

B) ARRANGE SPEAKERS FOR AUTUMN ATLANTIC COMMITTEE SEMINARS IN TROMSO AND TRONDHEIM AND MOTIVATE ATLANTIC COMMITTEE TO INCLUDE DEFENSE SPENDING AS KEY SEMINAR THEME. FUNDED IN FY 1978.

C) IDENTIFY MEMBERS OF THE NEWLY-CONSTITUTED PARLIAMENT WHO SHOULD BE SELECTED FOR FUTURE NATO TOURS, WITH EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FINANCE COMMITTEES. FUNDED IN 1978.

27. IF THIS EXPANDED AND MORE REFINED PROGRAM PROVES MANAGE-

ABLE AND EFFECTIVE, IT WILL BE WRITTEN INTO THE NEXT USIS
COUNTRY PLAN.

28. THE SUCCESS OF OUR POST'S EXPANDED PROGRAM WILL DEPEND ON
COOPERATION FROM MANY OTHERS. IN ADDITION TO INCREASED FINANCIAL
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SUPPORT FROM USNATO, WE WILL NEED THE EVEN MORE ACTIVE AID OF
USCINCEUR AND AFSOUTH TO MAKE EACH ASPECT OF OUR PROGRAMS MORE
SOPHISTICATED AND IMAGINATIVE, HAVING IN MIND OUR THEMES AND
TARGETS LISTED IN PARA 16 ABOVE.

29. IN THE BROADER CONTEXT, WE WONDER, TOO, IF THE USG SHOULD
NOT TRY TO ENCOURAGE A MORE SOPHISTICATED APPROACH BY NATIS TO
PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMMING. AT LEAST FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE WE
HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE BUREAUCRATIC AND OFTEN PERFUNCTORY
NATURE OF NATIS' APPROACH. NATURALLY, USNATO WILL HAVE A
MUCH GREATER FEEL FOR THIS, AND WE DEFER ENTIRELY TO YOUR JUDG-
MENT ON IT. WE NONETHELESS WONDER IF IN THE LONGER RANGE, THE
USG SHOULD NOT CONSIDER PROMPTING:

A) A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF THE ENTIRE NATIS OPERATION TO
DETERMINE HOW IT CAN BECOME MORE DIRECTLY RESPONSIVE TO THE
ALLIANCE'S CURRENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROBLEMS AND DEVOTE FEWER
PROGRAM RESOURCES TO "PRECHING TO THE CONVERTED";

B) A LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED BUT STANDARDIZED POLL IN ALL
NATO COUNTRIES MEASURING IN DEPTH PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
DEFENSE SPENDING, THE THREAT FROM THE EAST, AND THE ALLIES'
ABILITY TO MEET THE THREAT.

C) REGULAR ATTENTION AT TOP LEVEL NATO MEETINGS TO THE
ALLIANCE'S CURRENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROBLEMS.

30. WE INVITE COMMENT ON THIS EVALUATION AND PROGRAM PLAN FROM
BOTH ACTION AND INFO. ADDRESSEES. OSLO IO BELL WILL BE PREPARED
TO DISCUSS IT WHEN HE VISITS BRUSSELS JANUARY 13 AND 14.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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Control Number: n/a
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Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
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